[Ovmsdev] Urgent TLS root certificate issue (Let's Encrypt)

Stephen Casner casner at acm.org
Thu Sep 30 03:12:19 HKT 2021


Michael,

In 92ea05f4122e52b9c74e05f904c0c23eadbcbbb3 I think there may be
inconsistencies between CONFIG_MG_SSL_IF_WOLFTLS and
CONFIG_MG_SSL_IF_WOLFSSL.

                                                        -- Steve

On Wed, 29 Sep 2021, Michael Balzer wrote:

> Everyone,
>
> I've added a build configuration so we can easily switch between mbedTLS and
> WolfSSL. Default is to use mbedTLS for now.
>
> I also included removing the almost expired DST root certificate (no point in
> including that anymore) and the changes to avoid using xTimerIsTimerActive()
> (have been testing that on both my modules during the last days without issues
> and with improved stability).
>
> I've pushed everything, please have a look at the changes and test the new
> build.
>
> I've already rolled this out into "edge" on my server (3.2.016-299-g3d9cf7f5),
> if you don't want to build yourself.
>
> This would now be release candidate 3.2.017. We need to get this rolled out in
> "main" ASAP, as module OTA updates will be distributed over 24 hours.
>
> Regards,
> Michael
>
>
> Am 29.09.21 um 15:01 schrieb Michael Balzer:
> > Patch attached. Additionally I had set the boot debug level (early) to info
> > (may no longer be necessary as I later found that LOG_LOCAL_LEVEL #define in
> > esp32-crypt.h), and you need to disable log monitoring in the USB console to
> > prevent garbled output.
> >
> > I tried WOLFSSL_ALT_CERT_CHAINS but only got crashes with that.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Michael
> >
> >
> > Am 29.09.21 um 14:44 schrieb Mark Webb-Johnson:
> > >
> > > Can you send me the patch to enable debugging, and I will try with 3.3
> > > branch. I agree that rolling back 3.2 to mbedtls seems sensible for the
> > > short term.
> > >
> > > Regards, Mark
> > >
> > > P.S. I managed to fix this on another project running an old OpenSSL by
> > > removing the X3 trusted ca (it had both x1 and x3 trusted). Behavior is
> > > highly dependent on the library treatment of multiple verification paths
> > > and trusted ca vs cert chain conflicts.
> > >
> > > > On 29 Sep 2021, at 8:11 PM, Michael Balzer <dexter at expeedo.de> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >  I managed to get wolfSSL debug logs, but don't know how to interpret
> > > > them. See files attached.
> > > >
> > > > The final error seems to be...
> > > >
> > > > I (597167) wolfssl: wolfSSL Leaving DoCertificate, return -188
> > > > I (597177) wolfssl: wolfSSL Leaving DoHandShakeMsgType(), return -188
> > > > I (597187) wolfssl: wolfSSL Leaving DoHandShakeMsg(), return -188
> > > > E (597187) wolfssl: wolfSSL error occurred, error = 188 line:15818
> > > > file:/home/balzer/esp/Open-Vehic
> > > > E (597197) wolfssl: wolfSSL error occurred, error = 188 line:12507
> > > > file:/home/balzer/esp/Open-Vehic
> > > >
> > > > which is
> > > >     ASN_NO_SIGNER_E     = -188,  /* ASN no signer to confirm failure */
> > > >
> > > > I've had a look at the code, I don't see a chance to find the bug within
> > > > the remaining time.
> > > >
> > > > We're 24 hours from expiration. I'll try reverting the Mongoose-WolfSSL
> > > > commits now. Steve, if you already prepared something in that direction,
> > > > tell me.
> > > >
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Michael
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Am 29.09.21 um 09:56 schrieb Mark Webb-Johnson:
> > > > >
> > > > > The cross-signing bit seems to be on the X1 cert provided in the
> > > > > certificate chain by the server. The one provided there is signed by
> > > > > X3. The problem comes because a different X1 certificate may be
> > > > > provided as a trusted CA (and that X1 is self-signed with a long
> > > > > expiration date - 2035). So the verification process has two possible
> > > > > paths to verify the cert, and the result depends on which one it
> > > > > chooses (and how it handles a trusted CA cert supplementing /
> > > > > replacing one provided by the server).
> > > > >
> > > > > Overall, a mess. I'm fighting this same issue now with a bunch of
> > > > > systems in my day job, and likely a large part of the Internet is
> > > > > going to start to fail tomorrow. Particularly a lot of small embedded
> > > > > devices.
> > > > >
> > > > > Regards, Mark.
> > > > >
> > > > > > On 29 Sep 2021, at 2:51 PM, Michael Balzer <dexter at expeedo.de
> > > > > > <mailto:dexter at expeedo.de>> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signed PGP part
> > > > > > SNI was pretty much intact already, I took care of a remaining
> > > > > > Mongoose SNI bug in commit 9e4f31249856a67317f99920e47efa34f6734c73
> > > > > > / mongoose 8dc9012b57b85e062974fbdec17db30a501bf68f (April 2020).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I understand the WolfSSL chain management uses a supplied root cert
> > > > > > over one delivered by the server:
> > > > > > https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/wolfssl-manual/ch7/ → section 7.3
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Our problem could be either the wolfssl not recognising the X1
> > > > > > > cert, or not supporting the cross-signing arrangement (where there
> > > > > > > are two paths to verify - the expired X3 and the provided X1). I
> > > > > > > suspect the latter. In an ideal world, having both X1 and X3
> > > > > > > trusted shouldn't be a problem.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Is cross signing supported at all by WolfSSL? The only place I've
> > > > > > found it mentioned on wolfssl is this page:
> > > > > > https://www.wolfssl.com/certificate-chain-chain-trust/
> > > > > > ...where they say "(We'll cover cross-signing below)" ... but I
> > > > > > don't see them doing that.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > There is also no commit in their git history regarding cross-signed
> > > > > > certificates or multiple signatures, so I don't think updating to
> > > > > > 4.8.1 would help.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The intermediate "R3" has issuer "C=US, O=Internet Security Research
> > > > > > Group, CN=ISRG Root X1", which should match the new ISRG
> > > > > > certificate, but not the DST certificate. Maybe that's identified by
> > > > > > a fingerprint in the signature though (?), and maybe the DST
> > > > > > signature comes first and WolfSSL just doesn't check further
> > > > > > signatures if the first fails?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I'll look into the code later on, but need to take care of my daily
> > > > > > job duties first.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > If we can't fix this today, I think our best option is to switch
> > > > > > back to mbedTLS for the final 3.2 release and try to fix this for
> > > > > > the initial 3.3 release.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > Michael
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Am 29.09.21 um 03:40 schrieb Mark Webb-Johnson:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > It seems the dexter server returns different certificates
> > > > > > > depending on the presence of SNI extension in the TSL negotiation.
> > > > > > > That is pretty normal (where a single IP is serving multiple
> > > > > > > different websites), but I am not sure if our client library
> > > > > > > supports that?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Without SNI, we get:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >     Serial Number:
> > > > > > >     04:ab:25:e5:50:75:49:7b:9f:1b:39:8f:ed:3e:53:44:b4:54
> > > > > > >     Subject: CN=ns34.expeedo.de <http://ns34.expeedo.de/>
> > > > > > >      X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
> > > > > > >                     DNS:ns34.expeedo.de <http://ns34.expeedo.de/>
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > With SNI dexters-web.de <http://dexters-web.de/>, we get:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >     Serial Number:
> > > > > > >     03:be:45:05:45:aa:e3:da:cb:4c:38:ae:f6:90:2f:65:65:e0
> > > > > > >     Subject: CN=dexter.shopdriver.de
> > > > > > > <http://dexter.shopdriver.de/>
> > > > > > >     X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
> > > > > > >     DNS:dexter.shopdriver.de <http://dexter.shopdriver.de/>,
> > > > > > >     DNS:dexters-web.de <http://dexters-web.de/>,
> > > > > > >     DNS:ovms.dexters-web.de <http://ovms.dexters-web.de/>,
> > > > > > >     DNS:www.dexter.shopdriver.de
> > > > > > >     <http://www.dexter.shopdriver.de/>, DNS:www.dexters-web.de
> > > > > > >     <http://www.dexters-web.de/>
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Assuming the SNI is set correctly by our library, looking at the
> > > > > > > dexter.shopdriver.de <http://dexter.shopdriver.de/> chain, we
> > > > > > > have:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >     Subject: CN=dexter.shopdriver.de
> > > > > > > <http://dexter.shopdriver.de/>
> > > > > > >     Issuer: C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >     Subject: C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3
> > > > > > >     Issuer: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root
> > > > > > > X1
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >     Subject: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG
> > > > > > >     Root X1
> > > > > > >     Issuer: O=Digital Signature Trust Co., CN=DST Root CA X3
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >     and the components/ovms_tls/trustedca/dst.crt we have is:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >     Subject: O=Digital Signature Trust Co., CN=DST Root CA X3
> > > > > > >     Issuer: O=Digital Signature Trust Co., CN=DST Root CA X3
> > > > > > >     (Which expires Sep 30 14:01:15 2021 GMT and was issued just a
> > > > > > >     year earlier - ridiculous for a root CA)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The components/ovms_tls/trustedca/isrg_x1.crt is:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >     Subject: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG
> > > > > > >     Root X1
> > > > > > >     Issuer: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root
> > > > > > > X1
> > > > > > >     Validity
> > > > > > >                 Not Before: Jun  4 11:04:38 2015 GMT
> > > > > > >                 Not After : Jun  4 11:04:38 2035 GMT
> > > > > > >     sha256WithRSAEncryption 4096 bit
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Our problem could be either the wolfssl not recognising the X1
> > > > > > > cert, or not supporting the cross-signing arrangement (where there
> > > > > > > are two paths to verify - the expired X3 and the provided X1). I
> > > > > > > suspect the latter. In an ideal world, having both X1 and X3
> > > > > > > trusted shouldn't be a problem.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > There is a later 4.8.1 version of wolfssl (we seem to use 4.7.0
> > > > > > > released February 2021). Perhaps we can try to update to that?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Mark
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On 29 Sep 2021, at 4:11 AM, Michael Balzer <dexter at expeedo.de
> > > > > > > > <mailto:dexter at expeedo.de>> wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Signed PGP part
> > > > > > > > I can now confirm it's a WolfSSL issue :-(
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I've switched back to release 3.2.016, i.e. before changing to
> > > > > > > > WolfSSL, and the ISRG Root X1 certificate works perfectly, just
> > > > > > > > as it should.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Steve, I remember you included a config option to enable using
> > > > > > > > WolfSSL, but cannot find it now. Can you give me a pointer, or
> > > > > > > > did you remove that option later on?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Am 28.09.21 um 21:53 schrieb Stephen Casner:
> > > > > > > > > I wonder if we are hitting a key size limit in the WolfSSL
> > > > > > > > > code.  I
> > > > > > > > > know there are configuration parameters in user_settings.h for
> > > > > > > > > different SHA sizes, but I don't recall one for RSA keys.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >                                                          --
> > > > > > > > > Steve
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > On Tue, 28 Sep 2021, Michael Balzer wrote:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Still no luck, and getting clueless... :-/
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Let's Encrypt have a live test server:
> > > > > > > > > > https://valid-isrgrootx1.letsencrypt.org/
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Here's a simple test script to access that server:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > (function(){
> > > > > > > > > >      HTTP.request({
> > > > > > > > > >        url:"https://valid-isrgrootx1.letsencrypt.org/",
> > > > > > > > > >        always: function() { JSON.print(this); }
> > > > > > > > > >      });
> > > > > > > > > > })();
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Just copy this into the editor and evaluate.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > After commenting out the DST certificate from the TLS
> > > > > > > > > > source, the http request
> > > > > > > > > > terminates with an SSL error (-3) with installed...
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >   * self-signed ISRG certificate
> > > > > > > > > >   * cross-signed ISRG / DST root certificate
> > > > > > > > > >   * LE R3 certificate
> > > > > > > > > >   * any combination of these three.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > But the access works immediately after reinstalling the old
> > > > > > > > > > DST root
> > > > > > > > > > certificate. There is no DST reference in the chain of that
> > > > > > > > > > server...
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I found another ESP32 project -- not using WolfSSL but the
> > > > > > > > > > esp-idf SSL & MQTT
> > > > > > > > > > lib --; apparently all they needed to do was to add the very
> > > > > > > > > > same self-signed
> > > > > > > > > > ISRG X1 certificate I added:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >   *
> > > > > > > > > > https://github.com/LibreSolar/esp32-edge-firmware/commit/d6b6307cbdb60feb118355fda973eba11d52f8f5
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > So: why would WolfSSL not use the supplied ISRG certificate?
> > > > > > > > > > Why would it use
> > > > > > > > > > the DST cert without DST being present as an issuer?
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > The ISRG certificate is the only one having...
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >    signed using      : RSA with SHA-256
> > > > > > > > > >    RSA key size      : 4096 bits
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > But that would surely be supported by WolfSSL, wouldn't it?
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I'm running out of ideas, and this really isn't my primary
> > > > > > > > > > area. Any help is
> > > > > > > > > > appreciated.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > > > > > Michael
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Am 28.09.21 um 19:15 schrieb Stephen Casner:
> > > > > > > > > > > Michael,
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Certainly within our code as it stands there is not any
> > > > > > > > > > > mechanism to
> > > > > > > > > > > tell the WolfSSL code to adjust its certificate validation
> > > > > > > > > > > procedure.
> > > > > > > > > > > The browser certificate substitution that you hypothesize
> > > > > > > > > > > is not clear
> > > > > > > > > > > to me.  I would expect the validation to simply follow the
> > > > > > > > > > > chain.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >                                                           --
> > > > > > > > > > > Steve
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, 28 Sep 2021, Michael Balzer wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > More info:
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > All my browsers already have a builtin ISRG X1
> > > > > > > > > > > > certificate signed by ISRG
> > > > > > > > > > > > only, that's the new version:
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > https://crt.sh/?id=9314791
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > My server still sends the ISRG X1 certificate cross
> > > > > > > > > > > > signed / issued by DST
> > > > > > > > > > > > Root CA X3. That's the chain it got from Let's Encrypt
> > > > > > > > > > > > (via certbot) on
> > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > last renewal (last month!):
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > https://crt.sh/?id=3958242236
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > Without the DST root cert, WolfSSL then fails validating
> > > > > > > > > > > > the DST signed X1
> > > > > > > > > > > > root certificate (I assume):
> > > > > > > > > > > > https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/wolfssl-manual/ch7/
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > My servers will continue sending that chain including
> > > > > > > > > > > > the outdated root
> > > > > > > > > > > > cert
> > > > > > > > > > > > probably until the next renewal, so it's possible having
> > > > > > > > > > > > added the new X1
> > > > > > > > > > > > root
> > > > > > > > > > > > certificate didn't solve the issue.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > The browsers seem to know how to substitute the DST
> > > > > > > > > > > > signed certificate by
> > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > builtin self-signed (?). Is there a similar option in
> > > > > > > > > > > > WolfSSL, and do we
> > > > > > > > > > > > need
> > > > > > > > > > > > to enable that?
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > Steve, can you confirm this, do you know a solution?
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > > > > > > > Michael
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > Am 28.09.21 um 15:34 schrieb Michael Balzer:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > I've tried adding the intermediate cert ("R3") and
> > > > > > > > > > > > > then also my site
> > > > > > > > > > > > > certificate, that didn't help.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Only adding the DST cert again fixes the connection.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Any ideas?
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > OVMS# tls trust list
> > > > > > > > > > > > > ...
> > > > > > > > > > > > > ISRG Root X1 length 1939 bytes
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 1939 byte certificate: ISRG Root X1
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     cert. version     : 3
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     serial number     :
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 82:10:CF:B0:D2:40:E3:59:44:63:E0:BB:63:82:8B:00
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     issuer name       : C=US, O=Internet Security
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Research Group, CN=ISRG
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Root
> > > > > > > > > > > > > X1
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     subject name      : C=US, O=Internet Security
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Research Group, CN=ISRG
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Root
> > > > > > > > > > > > > X1
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     issued  on        : 2015-06-04 11:04:38
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     expires on        : 2035-06-04 11:04:38
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     signed using      : RSA with SHA-256
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     RSA key size      : 4096 bits
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     basic constraints : CA=true
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     key usage         : Key Cert Sign, CRL Sign
> > > > > > > > > > > > > ...
> > > > > > > > > > > > > dexter length 1972 bytes
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 1972 byte certificate: dexter
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     cert. version     : 3
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     serial number     :
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 04:55:1D:F4:27:A3:7D:E9:E4:A8:5C:37:F6:A1:61:87:3C:E5
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     issuer name       : C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     subject name      : CN=dexter.shopdriver.de
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <http://dexter.shopdriver.de/>
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     issued  on        : 2021-08-07 05:47:57
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     expires on        : 2021-11-05 05:47:55
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     signed using      : RSA with SHA-256
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     RSA key size      : 2048 bits
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     basic constraints : CA=false
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     subject alt name  :dexter.shopdriver.de
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <http://dexter.shopdriver.de/>,dexters-web.de
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <http://dexters-web.de/>,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > ovms.dexters-web.de
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <http://ovms.dexters-web.de/>,www.dexter.shopdriver.de,www.dexters-web.de
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     key usage         : Digital Signature, Key
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Encipherment
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     ext key usage     : TLS Web Server Authentication,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > TLS Web Client
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Authentication
> > > > > > > > > > > > > ...
> > > > > > > > > > > > > r3 length 1826 bytes
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 1826 byte certificate: r3
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     cert. version     : 3
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     serial number     :
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 91:2B:08:4A:CF:0C:18:A7:53:F6:D6:2E:25:A7:5F:5A
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     issuer name       : C=US, O=Internet Security
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Research Group, CN=ISRG
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Root
> > > > > > > > > > > > > X1
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     subject name      : C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     issued  on        : 2020-09-04 00:00:00
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     expires on        : 2025-09-15 16:00:00
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     signed using      : RSA with SHA-256
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     RSA key size      : 2048 bits
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     basic constraints : CA=true, max_pathlen=0
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     key usage         : Digital Signature, Key Cert
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Sign, CRL Sign
> > > > > > > > > > > > >     ext key usage     : TLS Web Client Authentication,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > TLS Web Server
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Authentication
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Am 28.09.21 um 15:07 schrieb Michael Balzer:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > We would need to bypass / shortcut the "eap" test
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > phase.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > But I agree, "master" is stable, I haven't had any
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > issues or reports,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > so I
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > think we could do that. The FreeRTOS timer issue I'm
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > working on only
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > affects very specific conditions, so not necessary
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > to wait for that.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > Should we remove the expiring DST certificate in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > that release then?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > ...uh oh: just tried removing the DST certificate:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > the module cannot
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > connect to my server anymore...!?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > I (490213) ovms-server-v2: Connection
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > isovms.dexters-web.de:6870
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <http://ovms.dexters-web.de:6870/>
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > TEST1
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > I (490213) ovms-server-v2: Status: Connecting...
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > V (490723) ovms-server-v2:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsServerV2MongooseCallback(MG_EV_CONNECT=-3)
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > W (490723) ovms-server-v2: Connection failed
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > E (490723) ovms-server-v2: Status: Error: Connection
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > failed
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > V (490723) ovms-server-v2:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsServerV2MongooseCallback(MG_EV_CLOSE)
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > I (490723) ovms-server-v2: Status: Disconnected
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > Am 28.09.21 um 14:32 schrieb Mark Webb-Johnson:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Shall we release a full update? The last 3.2?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > What we have now in master seems stable.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Mark
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 28 Sep 2021, at 5:39 PM, Michael
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Balzer<dexter at expeedo.de>
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >    Everyone,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > the DST root certificate we include (DST Root CA
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > X3) expires on
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > September 30, i.e. in two days.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > OVMS# tls trust list
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > DST Root CA X3 length 1200 bytes
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1200 byte certificate: DST Root CA X3
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     cert. version     : 3
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     serial number     :
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 44:AF:B0:80:D6:A3:27:BA:89:30:39:86:2E:F8:40:6B
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     issuer name       : O=Digital Signature
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Trust Co., CN=DST Root
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > CA X3
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     subject name      : O=Digital Signature
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Trust Co., CN=DST Root
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > CA X3
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     issued  on        : 2000-09-30 21:12:19
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > *  expires on        : 2021-09-30 14:01:15*
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     signed using      : RSA with SHA1
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     RSA key size      : 2048 bits
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     basic constraints : CA=true
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     key usage         : Key Cert Sign, CRL Sign
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > AFAICT, this root certificate is currently used
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > by the OVMS to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > validate Let's Encrypt certificates.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     *
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://letsencrypt.org/docs/dst-root-ca-x3-expiration-september-2021/
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     *https://letsencrypt.org/docs/certificate-compatibility/
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Unfortunately, we missed adding the followup LE
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > root certificate
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "ISRG
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Root X1" in time.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I've just added that certificate to our builtin
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > certificate
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > repository, but it's too late now to roll out a
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "main" update in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > time
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > (isn't it?).
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So, to prevent losing TLS connectivity with LE
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > servers, users need
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > manually add the ISRG Root X1 certificate to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > their TLS
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > repositories.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I've added a section on this to our user manual:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >     *https://docs.openvehicles.com/en/latest/userguide/ssltls.html
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If users contact you, point them to that page.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > We probably should also remove the expired DST
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > root certificate
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > after
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > September 30.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Michael
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ennepetal
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ennepetal
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> > > > > > > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Ennepetal
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > > > > > > > > > > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> > > > > > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > > > > > > Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
> > > > > > > > > > > > Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > > > > > > > > > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> > > > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > > > > Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
> > > > > > > > > > Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > > > > > > > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > > > > > > > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > > Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
> > > > > > > > Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > > > > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > > > > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> > > > > >
> > > > > > --
> > > > > > Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
> > > > > > Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
> > > > Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> > >
> > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > OvmsDev mailing list
> > > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
> >
> > --
> > Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
> > Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OvmsDev mailing list
> > OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> > http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
>
> --
> Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
> Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26


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