[Ovmsdev] Urgent TLS root certificate issue (Let's Encrypt)

Mark Webb-Johnson mark at webb-johnson.net
Wed Sep 29 09:40:42 HKT 2021


It seems the dexter server returns different certificates depending on the presence of SNI extension in the TSL negotiation. That is pretty normal (where a single IP is serving multiple different websites), but I am not sure if our client library supports that?

Without SNI, we get:

Serial Number:
            04:ab:25:e5:50:75:49:7b:9f:1b:39:8f:ed:3e:53:44:b4:54
Subject: CN=ns34.expeedo.de <http://ns34.expeedo.de/>
 X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                DNS:ns34.expeedo.de

With SNI dexters-web.de <http://dexters-web.de/>, we get:

Serial Number:
            03:be:45:05:45:aa:e3:da:cb:4c:38:ae:f6:90:2f:65:65:e0
Subject: CN=dexter.shopdriver.de <http://dexter.shopdriver.de/>
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                DNS:dexter.shopdriver.de, DNS:dexters-web.de, DNS:ovms.dexters-web.de, DNS:www.dexter.shopdriver.de, DNS:www.dexters-web.de

Assuming the SNI is set correctly by our library, looking at the dexter.shopdriver.de <http://dexter.shopdriver.de/> chain, we have:

Subject: CN=dexter.shopdriver.de <http://dexter.shopdriver.de/>
Issuer: C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3

Subject: C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3
Issuer: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1

Subject: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1
Issuer: O=Digital Signature Trust Co., CN=DST Root CA X3

and the components/ovms_tls/trustedca/dst.crt we have is:

Subject: O=Digital Signature Trust Co., CN=DST Root CA X3
Issuer: O=Digital Signature Trust Co., CN=DST Root CA X3
(Which expires Sep 30 14:01:15 2021 GMT and was issued just a year earlier - ridiculous for a root CA)

The components/ovms_tls/trustedca/isrg_x1.crt is:

Subject: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1
Issuer: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1
Validity
            Not Before: Jun  4 11:04:38 2015 GMT
            Not After : Jun  4 11:04:38 2035 GMT
sha256WithRSAEncryption 4096 bit

Our problem could be either the wolfssl not recognising the X1 cert, or not supporting the cross-signing arrangement (where there are two paths to verify - the expired X3 and the provided X1). I suspect the latter. In an ideal world, having both X1 and X3 trusted shouldn’t be a problem.

There is a later 4.8.1 version of wolfssl (we seem to use 4.7.0 released February 2021). Perhaps we can try to update to that?

Mark

> On 29 Sep 2021, at 4:11 AM, Michael Balzer <dexter at expeedo.de> wrote:
> 
> Signed PGP part
> I can now confirm it's a WolfSSL issue :-(
> 
> I've switched back to release 3.2.016, i.e. before changing to WolfSSL, and the ISRG Root X1 certificate works perfectly, just as it should.
> 
> Steve, I remember you included a config option to enable using WolfSSL, but cannot find it now. Can you give me a pointer, or did you remove that option later on?
> 
> 
> 
> Am 28.09.21 um 21:53 schrieb Stephen Casner:
>> I wonder if we are hitting a key size limit in the WolfSSL code.  I
>> know there are configuration parameters in user_settings.h for
>> different SHA sizes, but I don't recall one for RSA keys.
>> 
>>                                                         -- Steve
>> 
>> On Tue, 28 Sep 2021, Michael Balzer wrote:
>> 
>>> Still no luck, and getting clueless... :-/
>>> 
>>> Let's Encrypt have a live test server:
>>> https://valid-isrgrootx1.letsencrypt.org/ <https://valid-isrgrootx1.letsencrypt.org/>
>>> 
>>> Here's a simple test script to access that server:
>>> 
>>> (function(){
>>>     HTTP.request({
>>>       url: "https://valid-isrgrootx1.letsencrypt.org/" <https://valid-isrgrootx1.letsencrypt.org/>,
>>>       always: function() { JSON.print(this); }
>>>     });
>>> })();
>>> 
>>> Just copy this into the editor and evaluate.
>>> 
>>> After commenting out the DST certificate from the TLS source, the http request
>>> terminates with an SSL error (-3) with installed...
>>> 
>>>  * self-signed ISRG certificate
>>>  * cross-signed ISRG / DST root certificate
>>>  * LE R3 certificate
>>>  * any combination of these three.
>>> 
>>> But the access works immediately after reinstalling the old DST root
>>> certificate. There is no DST reference in the chain of that server...
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I found another ESP32 project -- not using WolfSSL but the esp-idf SSL & MQTT
>>> lib --; apparently all they needed to do was to add the very same self-signed
>>> ISRG X1 certificate I added:
>>> 
>>>  *
>>> https://github.com/LibreSolar/esp32-edge-firmware/commit/d6b6307cbdb60feb118355fda973eba11d52f8f5 <https://github.com/LibreSolar/esp32-edge-firmware/commit/d6b6307cbdb60feb118355fda973eba11d52f8f5>
>>> 
>>> 
>>> So: why would WolfSSL not use the supplied ISRG certificate? Why would it use
>>> the DST cert without DST being present as an issuer?
>>> 
>>> The ISRG certificate is the only one having...
>>> 
>>>   signed using      : RSA with SHA-256
>>>   RSA key size      : 4096 bits
>>> 
>>> But that would surely be supported by WolfSSL, wouldn't it?
>>> 
>>> I'm running out of ideas, and this really isn't my primary area. Any help is
>>> appreciated.
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> Michael
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Am 28.09.21 um 19:15 schrieb Stephen Casner:
>>>> Michael,
>>>> 
>>>> Certainly within our code as it stands there is not any mechanism to
>>>> tell the WolfSSL code to adjust its certificate validation procedure.
>>>> The browser certificate substitution that you hypothesize is not clear
>>>> to me.  I would expect the validation to simply follow the chain.
>>>> 
>>>>                                                          -- Steve
>>>> 
>>>> On Tue, 28 Sep 2021, Michael Balzer wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> More info:
>>>>> 
>>>>> All my browsers already have a builtin ISRG X1 certificate signed by ISRG
>>>>> only, that's the new version:
>>>>> 
>>>>> https://crt.sh/?id=9314791 <https://crt.sh/?id=9314791>
>>>>> 
>>>>> My server still sends the ISRG X1 certificate cross signed / issued by DST
>>>>> Root CA X3. That's the chain it got from Let's Encrypt (via certbot) on
>>>>> the
>>>>> last renewal (last month!):
>>>>> 
>>>>> https://crt.sh/?id=3958242236 <https://crt.sh/?id=3958242236>
>>>>> 
>>>>> Without the DST root cert, WolfSSL then fails validating the DST signed X1
>>>>> root certificate (I assume):
>>>>> https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/wolfssl-manual/ch7/ <https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/wolfssl-manual/ch7/>
>>>>> 
>>>>> My servers will continue sending that chain including the outdated root
>>>>> cert
>>>>> probably until the next renewal, so it's possible having added the new X1
>>>>> root
>>>>> certificate didn't solve the issue.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The browsers seem to know how to substitute the DST signed certificate by
>>>>> the
>>>>> builtin self-signed (?). Is there a similar option in WolfSSL, and do we
>>>>> need
>>>>> to enable that?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Steve, can you confirm this, do you know a solution?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>> Michael
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Am 28.09.21 um 15:34 schrieb Michael Balzer:
>>>>>> I've tried adding the intermediate cert ("R3") and then also my site
>>>>>> certificate, that didn't help.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Only adding the DST cert again fixes the connection.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Any ideas?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> OVMS# tls trust list
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>> ISRG Root X1 length 1939 bytes
>>>>>> 1939 byte certificate: ISRG Root X1
>>>>>>    cert. version     : 3
>>>>>>    serial number     : 82:10:CF:B0:D2:40:E3:59:44:63:E0:BB:63:82:8B:00
>>>>>>    issuer name       : C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG
>>>>>> Root
>>>>>> X1
>>>>>>    subject name      : C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG
>>>>>> Root
>>>>>> X1
>>>>>>    issued  on        : 2015-06-04 11:04:38
>>>>>>    expires on        : 2035-06-04 11:04:38
>>>>>>    signed using      : RSA with SHA-256
>>>>>>    RSA key size      : 4096 bits
>>>>>>    basic constraints : CA=true
>>>>>>    key usage         : Key Cert Sign, CRL Sign
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>> dexter length 1972 bytes
>>>>>> 1972 byte certificate: dexter
>>>>>>    cert. version     : 3
>>>>>>    serial number     :
>>>>>> 04:55:1D:F4:27:A3:7D:E9:E4:A8:5C:37:F6:A1:61:87:3C:E5
>>>>>>    issuer name       : C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3
>>>>>>    subject name      : CN=dexter.shopdriver.de
>>>>>>    issued  on        : 2021-08-07 05:47:57
>>>>>>    expires on        : 2021-11-05 05:47:55
>>>>>>    signed using      : RSA with SHA-256
>>>>>>    RSA key size      : 2048 bits
>>>>>>    basic constraints : CA=false
>>>>>>    subject alt name  : dexter.shopdriver.de, dexters-web.de,
>>>>>> ovms.dexters-web.de, www.dexter.shopdriver.de <http://www.dexter.shopdriver.de/>, www.dexters-web.de <http://www.dexters-web.de/>
>>>>>>    key usage         : Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
>>>>>>    ext key usage     : TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client
>>>>>> Authentication
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>> r3 length 1826 bytes
>>>>>> 1826 byte certificate: r3
>>>>>>    cert. version     : 3
>>>>>>    serial number     : 91:2B:08:4A:CF:0C:18:A7:53:F6:D6:2E:25:A7:5F:5A
>>>>>>    issuer name       : C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG
>>>>>> Root
>>>>>> X1
>>>>>>    subject name      : C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3
>>>>>>    issued  on        : 2020-09-04 00:00:00
>>>>>>    expires on        : 2025-09-15 16:00:00
>>>>>>    signed using      : RSA with SHA-256
>>>>>>    RSA key size      : 2048 bits
>>>>>>    basic constraints : CA=true, max_pathlen=0
>>>>>>    key usage         : Digital Signature, Key Cert Sign, CRL Sign
>>>>>>    ext key usage     : TLS Web Client Authentication, TLS Web Server
>>>>>> Authentication
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Am 28.09.21 um 15:07 schrieb Michael Balzer:
>>>>>>> We would need to bypass / shortcut the "eap" test phase.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> But I agree, "master" is stable, I haven't had any issues or reports,
>>>>>>> so I
>>>>>>> think we could do that. The FreeRTOS timer issue I'm working on only
>>>>>>> affects very specific conditions, so not necessary to wait for that.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Should we remove the expiring DST certificate in that release then?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> ...uh oh: just tried removing the DST certificate: the module cannot
>>>>>>> connect to my server anymore...!?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I (490213) ovms-server-v2: Connection is ovms.dexters-web.de:6870
>>>>>>> TEST1
>>>>>>> I (490213) ovms-server-v2: Status: Connecting...
>>>>>>> V (490723) ovms-server-v2:
>>>>>>> OvmsServerV2MongooseCallback(MG_EV_CONNECT=-3)
>>>>>>> W (490723) ovms-server-v2: Connection failed
>>>>>>> E (490723) ovms-server-v2: Status: Error: Connection failed
>>>>>>> V (490723) ovms-server-v2: OvmsServerV2MongooseCallback(MG_EV_CLOSE)
>>>>>>> I (490723) ovms-server-v2: Status: Disconnected
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Am 28.09.21 um 14:32 schrieb Mark Webb-Johnson:
>>>>>>>> Shall we release a full update? The last 3.2?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> What we have now in master seems stable.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Mark
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On 28 Sep 2021, at 5:39 PM, Michael Balzer <dexter at expeedo.de> <mailto:dexter at expeedo.de>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>   Everyone,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> the DST root certificate we include (DST Root CA X3) expires on
>>>>>>>>> September 30, i.e. in two days.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> OVMS# tls trust list
>>>>>>>>> DST Root CA X3 length 1200 bytes
>>>>>>>>> 1200 byte certificate: DST Root CA X3
>>>>>>>>>    cert. version     : 3
>>>>>>>>>    serial number     :
>>>>>>>>> 44:AF:B0:80:D6:A3:27:BA:89:30:39:86:2E:F8:40:6B
>>>>>>>>>    issuer name       : O=Digital Signature Trust Co., CN=DST Root
>>>>>>>>> CA X3
>>>>>>>>>    subject name      : O=Digital Signature Trust Co., CN=DST Root
>>>>>>>>> CA X3
>>>>>>>>>    issued  on        : 2000-09-30 21:12:19
>>>>>>>>> *  expires on        : 2021-09-30 14:01:15*
>>>>>>>>>    signed using      : RSA with SHA1
>>>>>>>>>    RSA key size      : 2048 bits
>>>>>>>>>    basic constraints : CA=true
>>>>>>>>>    key usage         : Key Cert Sign, CRL Sign
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> AFAICT, this root certificate is currently used by the OVMS to
>>>>>>>>> validate Let's Encrypt certificates.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>    *
>>>>>>>>> https://letsencrypt.org/docs/dst-root-ca-x3-expiration-september-2021/ <https://letsencrypt.org/docs/dst-root-ca-x3-expiration-september-2021/>
>>>>>>>>>    * https://letsencrypt.org/docs/certificate-compatibility/ <https://letsencrypt.org/docs/certificate-compatibility/>
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately, we missed adding the followup LE root certificate
>>>>>>>>> "ISRG
>>>>>>>>> Root X1" in time.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I've just added that certificate to our builtin certificate
>>>>>>>>> repository, but it's too late now to roll out a "main" update in
>>>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>>> (isn't it?).
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> So, to prevent losing TLS connectivity with LE servers, users need
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> manually add the ISRG Root X1 certificate to their TLS
>>>>>>>>> repositories.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I've added a section on this to our user manual:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>    * https://docs.openvehicles.com/en/latest/userguide/ssltls.html <https://docs.openvehicles.com/en/latest/userguide/ssltls.html>
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> If users contact you, point them to that page.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> We probably should also remove the expired DST root certificate
>>>>>>>>> after
>>>>>>>>> September 30.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
>>>>>>>>> Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> OvmsDev mailing list
>>>>>>>>> OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com <mailto:OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com>
>>>>>>>>> http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev <http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> OvmsDev mailing list
>>>>>>>> OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com <mailto:OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com>
>>>>>>>> http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev <http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
>>>>>>> Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> OvmsDev mailing list
>>>>>>> OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com <mailto:OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com>
>>>>>>> http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev <http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
>>>>>> Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OvmsDev mailing list
>>>>>> OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com <mailto:OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com>
>>>>>> http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev <http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
>>>>> Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OvmsDev mailing list
>>>>> OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com <mailto:OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com>
>>>>> http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev <http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev>
>>> --
>>> Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
>>> Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
>>> 
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OvmsDev mailing list
>>> OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com <mailto:OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com>
>>> http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev <http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev>
> 
> --
> Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
> Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
> 
> 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.openvehicles.com/pipermail/ovmsdev/attachments/20210929/60f24204/attachment-0001.htm>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 195 bytes
Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP
URL: <http://lists.openvehicles.com/pipermail/ovmsdev/attachments/20210929/60f24204/attachment-0001.sig>


More information about the OvmsDev mailing list