[Ovmsdev] Moving to a production cycle

Mark Webb-Johnson mark at webb-johnson.net
Thu Mar 15 12:37:38 HKT 2018


The vulnerability is the open access point, up until the time the user changes the password.

@Michael: Can we extend webserver to show a screen prompting for password change, when user logs in, if the current password is of the format: 20\d{8,8}\w{4,4}. Either that, or have a config setting to record that password has been changed, and keep prompting that change password screen, on login, until it has been set (then clear the flag). Change both the module and default wifi password to whatever is entered?

Firmware deadline for first production is Monday 19th March 2018, so I’ll tag the code on Sunday with wherever we are and build based on that. We always have OTA ...

Regards, Mark.

> On 15 Mar 2018, at 1:32 AM, Greg D. <gregd2350 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Interesting.  But the "hacker's delight" risk is only with physical access to the module, in order to reset it back to factory (somehow).  Once the module's password is changed by the owner, knowing the "master password" is useless.  Right?
> 
> Greg
> 
> 
> Mark Webb-Johnson wrote:
>> Just got a file in my eMail from factory. First 120 serial numbers. Like this:
>> 
>> 2018010014ABCD (last four characters redacted)
>> 
>> Very nice, and should work well. If we keep it quiet, the users will start an online discussion topic about the mysterious encoding in the last four characters of the serial number and what it means.
>> 
>> I also realised that those 120 lines in the file are a master password list for the OVMS modules! A hacker’s delight.
>> 
>> Regards, Mark.
>> 
>>> On 4 Mar 2018, at 12:35 PM, Mark Webb-Johnson <mark at webb-johnson.net <mailto:mark at webb-johnson.net>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Plan is as follows:
>>> 
>>> Serial numbers are of the form:
>>> 
>>> YYYYBBNNNNN
>>> 
>>> * YYYY is four digit year. For example; 2018
>>> * BB is two digit batch. For example; 00, 01, 02, etc
>>> * NNNN is four digit sequence. For example; 0001, 0002, etc
>>> 
>>> First production batch is 2018010001 - 2018010120.
>>> 
>>> That would be 10 digits. Not the most secure, and pretty predictable, but better than a simple “OVMS”.
>>> 
>>> I’m asking if the software they have can generate random characters. If it can, then will add four random letters onto the end.
>>> 
>>> Regards, Mark.
>>> 
>>>> On 4 Mar 2018, at 11:23 AM, Greg D. <gregd2350 at gmail.com <mailto:gregd2350 at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Hi Mark,
>>>> 
>>>> WPA2 PSK passphrases for WiFi need to be at least 8 characters.  Do the serial numbers have leading zeros?
>>>> 
>>>> Greg
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Mark Webb-Johnson wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> They’ll do pretty much whatever we ask them to do.
>>>>> 
>>>>> To try to formalise this, so everyone can see, I’ve created a production/qc/production_notes.txt file with the production notes that will be given to the China side. This should document all the production and QC steps they should do.
>>>>> 
>>>>> What I have at the moment is:
>>>>> 
>>>>> ********************************************************************************
>>>>> ** TOOLS
>>>>> ********************************************************************************
>>>>> 
>>>>> 1] DB9 CAN Bus QC tool
>>>>> 
>>>>>    DB9 Female with:
>>>>>     * Pins 2, 4, and 6 connected (all CAN-L signals)
>>>>>     * Pins 5, 7, and 8 connected (all CAN-H signals)
>>>>>     * R120 between pins 2 and 5
>>>>>     * External 12V power connector
>>>>>       * GND on pin 3
>>>>>       * +12V on pin 9
>>>>> 
>>>>> ********************************************************************************
>>>>> ** PRODUCTION STEPS
>>>>> ********************************************************************************
>>>>> 
>>>>> 1] Default wifi AP and module passwords
>>>>> 
>>>>>    OVMS> config set wifi.ap OVMS <serialnumber>
>>>>>    OVMS> config set password module <serialnumber>
>>>>> 
>>>>>    Where <serialnumber> is the serial number from the label on the enclosure.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I think that should set both the module default and auto wifi AP passwords to the serial number of the module. That will be on a label on the underside of the module.
>>>>> 
>>>>> You are correct: this is a connected car, with possibly disastrous consequences should somebody malicious gain access. Best to err on the side of caution.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Regards, Mark.
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 3 Mar 2018, at 4:07 AM, Michael Balzer <dexter at expeedo.de <mailto:dexter at expeedo.de>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Mark,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Am 26.02.2018 um 07:28 schrieb Mark Webb-Johnson:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I’ve asked the China side. Specifically:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Can you print serial number stickers for these modules? I can provide design - and we can print a large batch.
>>>>>>> Then, during manufacturing, have one step to enter serial number as password into module, like:
>>>>>>> Flash
>>>>>>> Connect terminal
>>>>>>> QC checks
>>>>>>> New step to type: config set wifi.ap OVMS <serialnumber>
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Just to double check: so we won't set the module password, only the AP pass phrase?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Has setting the module password any drawbacks?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I'm asking because I assume the SMS channel -as soon as implemented- will also provide command access, which would be open by default as well without a module password.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Setting the module password would secure the webserver as well.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> Michael Balzer * Helkenberger Weg 9 * D-58256 Ennepetal
>>>>>> Fon 02333 / 833 5735 * Handy 0176 / 206 989 26
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