[Ovmsdev] A Car Hacking Experiment: When Connectivity Meets Vulnerability

[Jakob Löw]

No real suprises in there, but it's cool to see there is professional
work towards OVMS and the Twizy. However I have two questions regarding
it: 
- When they describe brute forcing the sevcon access level protections,
is this the new protection in Twizy's >2016? Does this mean using this
one could tune the newer Twizy models?
- in Chapter V section B under "Throttle Control" they describe
reconfiguring the pedal behaviour. Could this be used whilst driving to
implement cruise control into the T?

On Fri, 2018-06-29 at 17:14 +0800, Mark Webb-Johnson wrote:
> FYI:
> 
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286931560_A_Car_Hacking_Expe
> riment_When_Connectivity_Meets_Vulnerability
> 
> Interconnected vehicles are a growing commodity providing remote
> access to on-board sys- tems for monitoring and controlling the state
> of the ve- hicle. Such features are built to facilitate and
> strengthen the owner’s knowledge about its car but at the same time
> they impact its safety and security. Vehicles are not ready to be
> fully connected as various attacks are currently possible against
> their control systems. In this paper, we analyse possible attack
> scenarios on a recently released all-electric car and investigate
> their impact on real life driving scenarios. We leverage our findings
> to change the behaviour of safety critical com- ponents of the
> vehicle in order to achieve autonomous driving using an Open
> Vehicle Monitoring System. Furthermore, to demonstrate the potential
> of our setup, we developed a novel mobile application able to control
> such vehicle systems remotely through the Internet. We challenge the
> current state-of-the-art technology in today’s vehicles and provide a
> vulnerability analysis on modern embedded systems.
> _______________________________________________
> OvmsDev mailing list
> OvmsDev at lists.openvehicles.com
> http://lists.openvehicles.com/mailman/listinfo/ovmsdev
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